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To appear in Routledge Handbook of Metaethics,
T. McPherson & D. Plunkett (Eds.)
1 Metaethical Contextualism: What?
An important function of language is to create and develop interpersonal relation-
ships in communication. In inquiry we share and coordinate our beliefs about how
the world is. But we also take a stance and socially orient ourselves toward possible
acts, attitudes, and states of affairs. We evaluate possibilities as desirable, appropri-
ate, horrible, trivial, permissible, wonderful. We make demands and grant permis-
sions, emphasize commonality and breed antipathy. In communication we shape
our identities as thinkers and feelers in a social world; we coordinate on how to act,
what to feel, and whom to be.
Language affords a variety of normative and evaluative resources for doing so.
Such resources include modal verbs and adjectives, among others, as in (1)–(2).
(1) Morally speaking, Sally must give to charity.
(2) Killing is morally wrong.
Our evaluation of sentences such as (1)–(2) depends on what moral norms we ac-
cept. (1) can seem acceptable if you accept moral norms requiring Sally to give to
charity, but unacceptable if you accept norms permitting her not to. Some theorists
claim that this dependence of our evaluation of (1) on what moral norms we accept
derives from a dependence of the interpretation of (1) on a contextually relevant
body of norms. Whether (1) is true or false, on these views, can vary across contexts
even if everything else in the world— the relevant facts about Sally’s circumstances,
available charities, etc.— remains fixed.
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Metaethical contextualism (hereafter ‘contextualism’) treats this context-dependence
as a dependence of the semantic (conventional) content of (1) on features of the con-
text of use, those features that determine a relevant body of moral norms. Contextu-
alism claims that (1) is context-sensitive in the sameway as sentences with paradigm
context-sensitive expressions— ‘here’, ‘now’, demonstratives (‘this’, ‘that’), pronouns
(‘I’, ‘she’), etc. What information is conveyed in uttering (3) depends on which fe-
male is most salient in the context.
(3) She won a medal.
In a context where Anna is most salient, uttering (3) communicates that Anna won
amedal; but in a context where Betty is most salient, uttering (3) communicates that
Betty won a medal. Likewise, according to contextualism, uttering (1) convention-
ally communicates, roughly, that the relevant moral norms in the conversational
context require Sally to give to charity. In a context where Alice’s moral norms NA
are relevant, (1) says that NA requires Sally to give to charity; but in a context where
Bert’s moral norms NB are relevant, (1) says that NB requires Sally to give to charity.
Contextualists differ on which norms are “relevant” in different contexts of use.
Some theorists say that it is the norms accepted by the speaker (Dreier 1990), some
that it is the norms accepted among a larger group or community (Harman 1975,
Wong 1984, 2006, Copp 1995, Velleman 2013). Others opt for a more flexible ap-
proach (Finlay 2004, 2009, 2014, Silk 2016; cf. DeRose 2009). Contextualists also
differ on what sort of object normative sentences are relativized to. One might treat
normative sentences as sensitive to codes of practice (Copp 1995), standards (Silk
2016), ends (Finlay 2009, 2014), or motivational attitudes (Harman 1975, Dreier
1990), among other things. To fix ideas Iwill couch the discussion in terms of norms,
but nothing substantive hangs on this. So, what unifies contextualist theories is the
claim that what a sentence such as (1) conventionally communicates, and hence
whether it is true or false, depends on what body of moral norms (standard, code,
etc.) is relevant in the conversational context.
The target of this chapter is broadly normative uses of language. By ‘normative
use of language’ Imean a usewhich expresses the speaker’s endorsement of a relevant
body of norms or values (cf. Gibbard 1990: 33). This includes certain aesthetic uses,
moral uses, non-moral evaluative uses, legal uses, etc. Not all uses of expressions
such as ‘must’, ‘may’, ‘right’, ‘duty’, ‘beautiful’, etc. are normative in this sense. For
instance, the use of ‘must’ in (4) targets a relevant body of information, and the use
of ‘can’ in (5) targets the relevant biological and environmental circumstances.
(4) It must be raining outside. Look at all those people with wet umbrellas.
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(5) Polar bears can survive here.
Further, some uses which concern relevant norms or values are merely descriptive.
In using ‘have to’ in (6), the speaker is simply reporting what Dwayne’s parents’ rules
require; (6) can be paraphrased with an explicit ‘according to’-type phrase, as in (7).
(6) Dwayne has to be home by 10. Aren’t his parents stupid? I’d stay out if I
were him.
(7) According to Dwayne’s parents’ rules, Dwayne has to be home by 10.
All theories can accept that some uses of ‘must’, ‘wrong’, etc. are context-sensitive
in the same way as the pronoun ‘she’ in (3). The distinctive claim of contextualism
is that the intuitively normative uses, in the above sense— the sorts of uses char-
acteristic of deliberation and planning—are context-sensitive in the same kind of
way as (3) and (6). (Hereafter I will use ‘normative language’ as short for ‘norma-
tive uses of language’, though the qualification in this paragraph should be kept in
mind. Though I will often treat all types of normative uses on a par, it is in principle
possible to accept contextualism about certain types of normative language but not
others. I will use ‘(meta)ethics’ broadly to cover not just morality but the variety of
normative and evaluative domains.)
Contextualism, in this sense, sometimes goes under the heading of ‘Metaethical
Relativism’ (Harman 1975, 1996, Dreier 1990). The view has a checkered past. Seri-
ous objections have been raised, both on linguistic andon substantive (meta)normative
grounds. Many respond by distinguishing the context-sensitivity of normative lan-
guage from that of paradigm context-sensitive expressions, or by denying that nor-
mative language is distinctively context-sensitive at all.
There are twomain classes of linguistic data that have been thought problematic
for contextualism: first, discourse phenomena involving agreement and disagree-
ment; and second, the interpretation of normative language in certain complex lin-
guistic environments, such as in attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports.
§2 examines the discourse properties of normative language, and presents a stan-
dard version of the argument from disagreement. §3 examines the embedding be-
havior of normative language in ascriptions of normative attitudes. Contextualist
theories have largely failed to appreciate the apparent contrasts between normative
language and paradigm context-sensitive language. §4 further presses this worry by
examining the contextual underspecification characteristic of normative language
in conversation. §5 briefly outlines a strategy for implementing what I regard as an
improved version of contextualism (developed in Silk 2016).
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Although contextualism is a linguistic thesis, contextualist theories are often
motivated by broader substantive (meta)normative aims—e.g., to capture the con-
nection between normative judgment and motivation, to avoid positing a realm of
distinctively normative properties (facts, truths), and to explain the alleged fault-
lessness of fundamental normative disagreement. §6 examines the relation between
contextualist semantics for normative language, and broader philosophical theoriz-
ing about the nature of normativity and the distinctive features of normative dis-
course and thought.
Finally, §7 concludes by describing several limitations of the present discussion
and additional directions for future research.
Before getting started, I would like tomake two clarificatory remarks about what
kind of context-sensitivity is at-issue in debates about contextualism. First, contex-
tualists sometimes motivate their views by noting that many modal verbs can have
different “senses” or “readings” in different contexts, as we saw with (4)–(7). Such
context-sensitivity in certainwords, qua lexical items, is well-known (Kratzer 1977).
But it is insufficient for contextualism, in the relevant sense. All parties can accept
that (e.g.) ‘must’ is context-sensitive in the sense that context determines what type
of reading the modal receives. What is at issue is whether, given a specific type of
normative reading— say, moral, as in (1)— some particular body of norms sup-
plied by the context of use figures in the sentence’s semantic content, where what
norms are supplied may vary across contexts in the same world. Non-contextualist
accounts deny this (more on which below). Debates about contextualism can arise
for words whose lexical semantics already fixes a specific reading (e.g., aesthetic for
‘beautiful’) and complex expressions in which the relevant reading is linguistically
specified (e.g., ‘morally wrong’).
Second, treating certain normative claims as relativized, in some sense, to rele-
vant norms (standards, ends, etc.) isn’t sufficient for contextualism. What is essen-
tial for contextualism is that there be a dependence of semantic content on norms
determined as a function of the context of use (see above). Non-contextualist “rela-
tivizing” accounts would deny this— e.g., by positing relativization to norms deter-
mined by the circumstances of the subject, leading to a kind of invariantism, or to
norms determined by a posited context of assessment, leading to a kind of relativism
(in the sense of John MacFarlane’s work). Informal relativizing claims— like that ‘x
is wrong’ can be true “relative to” (as applied to, etc.) one person/group but false rel-
ative to another— fail to distinguish among the candidate semantic theories. (For
this reason it isn’t always clear where many self-described “relativist” views fall on
questions of contextualism, relativism, etc. in the present senses of these positions.)
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2 Normative Disagreement in Discourse
Contextualists treat a particular body of norms determined by the context of use as
figuring in the truth-conditions of a normative sentence. So, to give a proper ac-
count of the meaning of normative language, the contextualist must provide a gen-
eral account of what body of norms is supplied as a function of context and figures
in deriving semantic content. This is no different from how a semantics for ‘she’
must provide a general account of what individual is referred to given a context of
use c—e.g., that ‘she’ refers to the maximally salient female in c. The putative prob-
lem is that, in the case of normative language, there doesn’t seem to be any way of
specifying the contextually relevant norms that explains both (a) how we’re in a po-
sition to make the normative claims we seem licensed in making (call it the justified
use condition), and (b) how we can reasonably disagree with one another’s norma-
tive claims (call it the disagreement condition) (cf. Gibbard 1990, 2003, Kölbel 2002,
Lasersohn 2005, Richard 2008, MacFarlane 2014).
SupposeAlice andBert are considering howmuch, if anything, morality requires
Sally to give to the poor. They agree on all the relevant non-normative facts, like how
much Sally earns, how stable her job is, what the needs of the poor are like, and so
on. Their question is fundamentally normative: it concerns what moral norms to
accept. The following dialogue ensues:
(8) Alice: Morally speaking, Sally must give to charity.
Bert: No, Sally doesn’t have to give to charity. She can keep what she has
for herself and her family and friends.
What body of norms should the contextualist say figures in the interpretation of
Alice’s and Bert’s utterances?
Suppose, first, that Alice’s utterance of (1) is just about her moral norms. As-
suming Alice is in a position to make a claim about what moral norms she accepts,
this captures how Alice is justified in making her normative claim. But it becomes
unclear how Bert can reasonably disagree with her. And it becomes unclear how in
uttering (9) Bert is disagreeing with Alice, given that they are making claims about
their respective moral norms.
(9) No, Sally doesn’t have to give to charity.
Bert’s denial in (8) is felicitous, whereas B’s denial in (10) is not.
(10) A: In view of Alice’s moral norms, Sally must give to charity.
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B: #No, in view of Bert’s moral norms, Sally doesn’t have to give to charity.
This puts pressure on the claim that (10a) and (10b) explicitly specify the semantic
contents of (1) and (9), respectively.
Suppose instead thatwe treat normative claims as about a relevant group’s norms.
AssumingAlice’s andBert’s utterances target the same group, this captures howAlice
and Bert make inconsistent claims. But it becomes unclear howAlice is in a position
to make a claim about whether Sally must give, which, intuitively, she is. It can be
appropriate for Alice to utter (1) even if she doesn’t know anything about Bert’s (or
whomever else’s) moral views.
In sum, the objection from disagreement is that if we treat normative claims as
about the speaker’s norms (“speaker contextualism”), we capture the justified use
condition but leave the disagreement condition unexplained. But if we treat norma-
tive claims as about the norms of a larger group (“group contextualism”), we capture
the disagreement condition but leave the justified use condition unexplained. There
seems to be no general way of specifyingwhat body of norms is relevant as a function
of context that captures all our intuitions.
There ismuch to say about the nature of disagreement, both in general and about
normativematters specifically. For our purposes, we can focus on a certain discourse
phenomenon: the licensing of expressions of linguistic denial (‘no’, ‘nu-uh’, etc.) in
dialogues such as (8). Not all cases in which speakers intuitively disagree can be
marked in this way. B’s “disagreement in attitude” with A in (11) couldn’t typically
be signaled with a linguistic denial.
(11) A: I like Mexican food.
B: #No, I don’t. I like Thai.
A common contextualist strategy is to try to explain the licensing of expressions
of linguistic denial (“LELD”) in the pragmatics, in terms of non-conventional aspects
of the use of normative language in concrete conversations. Many contextualists
note that denials can target various non-truth-conditional aspects of utterances (e.g.,
Björnsson & Finlay 2010: 19–20; Sundell 2011: 275–83; Plunkett & Sundell 2013:
11–22). B’s denials in (12)–(13), for instance, target a presupposition and scalar
implicature, respectively.
(12) A: The king of France was at the awards ceremony.
B: No, there is no king of France.
(13) A: Sally won two medals.
B: No, she won three.
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So, the speaker contextualist might say that the proposition targeted by Bert’s de-
nial in (8) isn’t Alice’s “autobiographical report”— the semantic content of her ut-
terance—but rather “the proposition that he would have asserted by uttering the
same sentence” (Björnsson & Finlay 2010: 20). One might say that even though,
semantically, Alice’s utterance just makes a claim about her moral norms, the pri-
mary implication Alice intends to convey is a pragmatically related proposition to
which Bert is licensed in objecting. One plausible candidate is an implication that
Bert ought to conform hismoral views to Alice’s. It is this implication, the reply con-
tinues, which is felicitously targeted by Bert’s denial. In uttering (1)/(9), Alice and
Bert “pragmatically advocate” (Plunkett & Sundell 2013) for their respective moral
views.
Contextualists have been right to emphasize that incompatibility of convention-
ally asserted content isn’t necessary for discourse disagreement. Intuitively, Alice
and Bert are disagreeing, not about whether Sally’s giving to charity is required by
such-and-such norms, but about what norms to accept. They are managing their
assumptions about what moral norms are operative in the context. Simply noting
this, however, is insufficient. The question isn’t whether such “metacontextual” ne-
gotiations are possible. The challenge is to explain why they are so systematic with
normative language, given that a contextualist semantics is correct (Silk 2014, 2016).
The above contextualist replies posit that the implications systematically targeted
by linguistic denials— and affirmations, for that matter— in normative discourse
are implications other than the utterances’ semantic contents. Yet surprisingly little
attention has been given towhat specificmechanisms are responsible for this, or how
these mechanisms are linguistically constrained— i.e., how the (dis)agreement phe-
nomena can be derived from the specific semantic contents, general conversational
principles, and general features of contexts of use, and why they can be derived so
systematicallywith normative language but notwith paradigmcontext-sensitive lan-
guage. When speakers use paradigmcontext-sensitive expressions (“PCS”-expressions)
with different intended asserted contents, the norm isn’t disagreement, but talking
past. Denials like B’s in (14)–(15) are typically infelicitous.
(14) A: I’m hungry.
B: #No, I’m not hungry.
(15) A: That is a cute baby. [said demonstrating b]
B: #No, that isn’t a cute a baby. [said demonstrating b′]
‘I’m hungry’ doesn’t systematically trigger an implication that the addressee ought
to be hungry. ‘That [demonstrating b] is a cute baby’ doesn’t systematically trigger
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an implication that the addressee ought to be demonstrating b. One is left won-
dering why the assumed pragmatic mechanisms which license linguistic denials
with normative language couldn’t (and systematically don’t) also apply with PCS-
expressions. Why should uttering a sentence which conventionally describes given
bodies of norms systematically communicate something about what norms to ac-
cept? Whywould speakers systematically assert “normative propositions” they don’t
have a “fundamental interest” in (Finlay 2014: 147–50, 184–8, 217–22)? Why would
the asserted contents of normative utterances, unlike other utterances, typically not
have main point status?
In sum, a prototypical function of normative language is to manage speakers’
assumptions about the very features of context onwhich its interpretation intuitively
depends. Normative language contrasts with paradigm context-sensitive language
in this respect. The worry is that the distinctive behavior of normative language in
discourse is unexpected given the contextualist’s semantics. The force of this worry
has been underappreciated by contextualists.
3 Normative Attitudes and Attitude Ascriptions
§2 considered various discourse properties of normative language—how context af-
fects the interpretation of normative language, and how normative language is used
to change context andmanage what norms to accept. A second class of objections to
contextualism concerns the interpretation of normative language in certain complex
linguistic environments. I will focus on two objections in this area. (For discussion
of additional objections, see Silk 2016: ch. 4 and references therein.)
3.1 Characterizing normative states of mind
The first objection is that contextualism mischaracterizes normative states of mind.
Call an attitude ascription like (16) with a normative sentence as its complement
clause a normative attitude ascription.
(16) Alice thinks Sally must give to charity.
Insofar as contextualism treats the contextually relevant norms as figuring in the
content of a normative sentence, contextualismwould seem to treat (16) as ascribing
to Alice the belief that her moral norms require Sally to give to charity. The worry is
that this incorrectly treats normative attitudes as states of mind about what norms
one accepts.
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Consider the following example from Silk 2013 (207–8):
Suppose you encourage Gabriel, your infant brother, to put his fingers
into the electrical outlet. Gabriel, smart chap that he is, recoils; his
mother has repeatedly scolded him not to do so. You say:
[(17)] Gabriel knows he shouldn’t put his fingers into the outlet.
This seems true; you are attributing a certain normative belief toGabriel.
But it is implausible that [(17)] is true only if Gabriel has a belief about
his, or anyone else’s, normative views. He’s just a baby.
As Silk (2013: 208) puts it, “Whether one can represent or take a certain perspec-
tive on normative standards is independent of whether one can have a normative
standard.” Likewise, (18) doesn’t ascribe to Bert the sort of attitude ascribed in (19):
(18) Bert fears that he must give to charity.
(19) ≉Bert fears that his/our/whomever’smoral views entail that he gives to charity.
Bert’s fear is about the moral status of his giving to charity, not about himself or the
stringency of his moral views.
So, normative attitude ascriptions don’t seem to ascribe meta-attitudes about a
relevant individual/group or their norms. They seem to characterize the subject’s
first-order normative views themselves. (16) characterizes Alice as accepting moral
norms which require Sally to give to charity. The challenge is to capture this within
a contextualist semantics.
3.2 Factive attitudes
A second objection is that normative language seems to behave differently from
paradigm context-sensitive (PCS) language when embedded under factive attitude
verbs (Weatherson 2008, Lasersohn 2009)— roughly speaking, verbs which imply
the truth of their complements, such as ‘know’ or ‘realize’. (I will bracket whether
the implication of the complement is a presupposition or entailment.)
Suppose the contextualist continues to treat (16) as ascribing to Alice the be-
lief that her moral norms require Sally to give to charity. Assume Alice is correct
about what her moral views are, so that this belief is true and constitutes knowledge.
Nevertheless, if we take Sally’s giving to charity to be supererogatory, we may be
unwilling to accept (20).
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(20) Alice knows that Sally must give to charity.
This is surprising given the contextualist’s semantics: if Alice’s belief constitutes
knowledge, why can’t we report it as such? PCS-expressions don’t appear to dis-
play this sort of behavior. If we accept (21a), and we accept that S’s belief that we are
philosophers constitutes knowledge, then we cannot coherently reject (21b).
(21) a. S thinks we are philosophers.
b. S knows we are philosophers.
Likewise for PCS-expressions that allow being linked to the attitude subject: Sup-
pose we accept (22a) in a context where ‘local’ is interpreted, roughly, as “local to
Weatherson.” Perhaps we think Weatherson is in Ann Arbor, and we attribute to
Weatherson the belief that Al is at Ashley’s, a bar in Ann Arbor. In such a context, if
we accept that Weatherson’s belief that Al is at Ashley’s constitutes knowledge, there
is no inclination to reject (22b).
(22) a. Weatherson thinks Al is at a local bar.
b. Weatherson knows Al is at a local bar.
Intuitively, even if Alice’s belief that her moral norms require Sally to give to
charity constitutes knowledge, we cannot report this using (20) since doing sowould
seem to commit us to requiring Sally to give to charity. But this dual linking— to the
discourse context and the attitude subject— seems incompatible with the contextu-
alist’s semantics, which requires a specific body of norms to determine the content of
the complement clause. If we link ‘must’ in (20) to Alice’s norms, we fail to explain
why we resist accepting (20) (still assuming we side with Bert). But if we interpret
‘must’ with respect to our moral norms, we incorrectly characterize Alice’s state of
mind. No single body of norms captures both what the truth of (20) commits Alice
to and what its felicitous use commits the speaker to.
4 Normative Language and Contextual Felicity
Rather than lexically associating normative language with a specific feature of con-
text, like the speaker, many contextualists opt for a more flexible approach which
leaves a role for communicative intentions in determining what norms are supplied
(§1). There is an additional challenge for such views which hasn’t yet received at-
tention in the literature. This challenge raises interesting general questions about
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felicity constraints, accommodation, and interpretive strategies in cases of contex-
tual underspecification. (See Silk 2016 for further discussion.)
Many PCS-expressions impose what Tonhauser et al. 2013 calls a strong contex-
tual felicity (SCF) constraint: they cannot be felicitously used if their presupposi-
tions aren’t antecedently satisfied in the context. Using ‘too’ in (23) is infelicitous if
we haven’t been talking about someone other than Sheila eating out tonight.
(23) #Sheila is eating out tonight, too.
Upon hearing (23), you won’t be content to infer that (I think) some relevant person
or other, besides Sheila, is eating out tonight. You will object and want to knowwho.
Likewise with (3), as reinforced in (24):
(24) [Context: We are standing opposite three women. You don’t know any of
them, and you don’t think I do either. As far as you’re concerned, they are
relevantly indistinguishable. I say:]
#She won a medal.
Even after my utterance, none of the three women is more salient than any other.
Yet it’s not as if my utterance is completely uninformative to you. You can infer that
I take one of the women to be most salient, and that whichever woman I take to be
most salient won a medal. But you won’t rest content with accommodating these
inferences. My use of ‘she’ is infelicitous.
By contrast, I can felicitously utter (1) even if no particular body of moral norms
is antecedently salient in the discourse. Upon hearing (1) one would typically be
content to infer that (I think) the relevant norms, whatever exactly they are, require
that Sally gives to charity. We can make progress in moral inquiry without needing
to commit to some particular body of moral norms.
The worry is this: On the type of contextualist semantics we are considering,
using normative language assumes a lexically unspecified body of norms, andmakes
a claim about it. This is precisely analogous to the case of (e.g.) pronouns: using
‘she’ assumes a certain salient female, and makes a claim about her. Why, then, in
cases of contextual underspecification, are interlocutors content to accommodate
with normative language, but not with (e.g.) pronouns? If normative language is
given the same kind of semantic analysis as (e.g.) pronouns, whence the contrast in
felicity conditions?
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5 Managing Context in Language Use
The theme of §§2–4 is that there seem to be important differences between nor-
mative language and paradigm context-sensitive language, as concerning their dis-
course properties, embedding behavior, and felicity conditions. These differences
put pressure on the claim that normative language and paradigm context-sensitive
language are semantically context-sensitive in the same general kind of way. Many
contextualists have responded by positing linguistically unconstrained interpretive
mechanisms and ad hoc pragmatic principles. What is needed, however, and what
existing contextualist accounts have failed to provide, is a detailed explanation of
the distinctive features of normative language in terms of specific features of their
conventional meaning and general interpretive and pragmatic principles. Providing
such an account is, in my view, the central challenge for contextualism.
Some theorists have responded by distinguishing the context-sensitivity of nor-
mative language from that of PCS-expressions, adopting relativist or expressivist se-
mantics (Gibbard 1990, 2003, Kölbel 2002, Silk 2013, MacFarlane 2014). Others
deny that normative language is distinctively context-sensitive, adopting realist in-
variantist semantics. Though such non-contextualist theories may avoid the sorts
of worries canvassed in §§2–4, they face non-trivial burdens of their own— for in-
stance, for the relativist and expressivist, to provide accounts of assertion, belief,
and truth; for the invariantist, to provide positive evidence that specific substantive
(meta)normative views are encoded in the conventional meaning of normative lan-
guage. Some of these burdens have begun to be addressed, but accounts are often
admittedly incomplete.
In the remainder of this section I would like to briefly outline what I regard as a
more promising contextualist strategy of reply, developed in greater detail elsewhere
(Silk 2016). This should give a flavor for the kinds of explanatory resources available
to the contextualist going forward.
First, observe that, contrary to initial appearances, many PCS-expressions ex-
hibit the same sorts of puzzling linguistic behavior seen with normative language
(Silk 2014, 2016). Consider discourse disagreement. Suppose Amanda and Billy
are playing with three children, two white and one non-white. Amanda is a racist
against non-whites, and Billy knows this. The two white children, Will and Wilma,
are laughing, and the one non-white child, Nick, isn’t. Amanda says:
(25) Look, the children (/they) are laughing!
Roughly, (25) says that everyone in the most salient group of children is laughing.
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So, insofar as Amanda intends to say something true, it is mutually obvious that she
is assuming that the most salient group of children includes only Will and Wilma.
Since it is mutually accepted that there would be no non-racist grounds for treating
Nick as less salient thanWill andWilma, Amanda’s utterance of (25) thus implicitly
suggests that Nick’s being non-white is a sufficient reason not to be talking about
him. If Billy doesn’t object to Amanda’s utterance, he will accommodate her in this
assumption. This can set the stage for further exclusionary behavior in the future.
To avoid such a consequence, Billymight object by explicitly calling out Amanda
on her assumption; he might say something like, ‘Wait a minute, why are you ignor-
ing Nick?’ But Billy needn’t be so explicit; he might say:
(26) No, the children (/they) aren’t laughing. Nick is bored out of his mind.
Insofar as Billy intends to say something true, it is mutually obvious that he intends
his use of ‘the children’ to pick out a group that includes Nick. In uttering (26) Billy
acts in a way which assumes that Nick is included in the group under discussion,
and thus that Nick isn’t to be ignored simply because of his race. This can lead to
(implicit or explicit) negotiation about which children are salient and why.
Or consider factive attitude ascriptions. Suppose Billy accepts (27) in a context
where ‘the children’ is linked to Amanda’s belief state.
(27) Amanda thinks the children are laughing.
Though Billy accepts (27), and (let’s suppose) he accepts that Amanda’s belief that
Will and Wilma are laughing constitutes knowledge, he may resist accepting (28).
(28) Amanda knows the children are laughing.
After all, Billy might say, the children aren’t laughing; Nick is bored out of his mind.
Similar examples can be constructed with other PCS-expressions. The relevant
observations: The intended contents of Amanda’s and Billy’s utterances in (25)–(26)
are compatible, and yet they disagree. Uttering (28) can express Billy’s assumptions
about the contextual features determining the content of ‘the children’; this can be
the case even when the content of the attitude is determined in light of Amanda’s
state of mind. What these examples highlight is that although what is typically rele-
vant in uses of PCS-expressions is their truth-conditional content, rather than what
their use assumes about the features of context which determine that content, this
generalization isn’t without exception.
This illuminates a strategy for developing contextualism. Perhaps by examin-
ing what distinguishes the exceptional cases with PCS-expressions, such as (25)–
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(28), we can learn something about the distinctive discourse properties of norma-
tive language. Drawing on work in artificial intelligence, Silk 2016 argues that the
sort of context-management we see with certain uses of context-sensitive expres-
sions is characteristic of collaborative action generally. The appropriateness of our
actions often requires that circumstances are a certain way. In acting, we can exploit
ourmutual world knowledge and general abductive reasoning skills to communicate
information and manage our assumptions about these circumstances. By acting in
such a way that is appropriate only if the context is a certain way, one can implicitly
propose that the context be that way. If the other party accommodates by proceeding
in like manner, it can become taken for granted that the context is that way. If she
doesn’t, this can lead to negotiation over the state of the context. This can all happen
without explicitly raising the issue of what the context is like. The linguistic case—
the case of linguistic action, and interpretation—can be seen as a special instance of
these phenomena. Using context-sensitive language presupposes that the concrete
context determines a value for the relevant contextual parameter (body of norms,
salience ordering, etc.) that renders one’s utterance true and appropriate. Speakers
can then integrate their mutual grammatical knowledge and general pragmatic rea-
soning skills to manage their assumptions about the very features of context that
determine the intended contents of their uses of context-sensitive expressions.
The contextualist, of course, cannot stop here. The challenge isn’t just to explain
how speakers can communicate information about what norms context supplies in
using normative language. It is also to explain the systematicity with which norma-
tive language, unlike paradigm context-sensitive language, is used in this way. But
the above observations provide the basis for conversational explanations of the rele-
vant differences among context-sensitive expressions. Silk 2016 argues that many
of these differences can be derived from the sentences’ specific contents (truth-
conditional and presupposed) and typical features of conversations— e.g., concern-
ing questions under discussion, speakers’ (extra-)conversational goals, and speak-
ers’ substantive normative views. The account, called Discourse Contextualism, is
extended to capture the behavior of normative language in various complex linguis-
tic environments (e.g., attitude ascriptions, conditionals), drawing on independent
principles of local interpretation. Whether the approach will ultimately succeed or
prove superior to alternative non-contextualist theories remains to be seen. At min-
imum, examining the broader phenomena promises to shed light on more general
issues concerning (e.g.) the varieties of context-sensitivity in natural language, the
nature and origins of presupposition, the role of context in communication and col-
laborative action, and the relations among truth, meaning, and assertion.
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6 Metaethics in Metaethical Contextualism
So far we have been focusing on metaethical contextualism as a linguistic thesis.
But what originally motivated the view—and what has kept many metaethicists at-
tracted to it— aren’t primarily linguistic issues, but substantive philosophical issues
about the metaphysics of normative properties, the nature of normative knowledge,
and the psychology of normative judgment. In this section I will briefly consider
several oft-perceived metaethical payoffs of adopting a contextualist semantics. I
will suggest that the relation between the semantic issues and the broader dialectic
in metaethics is less straightforward than is often assumed.
A first common motivation for contextualism concerns the psychology of nor-
mative judgment (Harman 1975, Dreier 1990, Finlay 2004, 2014; contrast Wong
2006: ch. 7). We typically take people to have at least some motivation to act in
accordance with their sincere normative judgments. Suppose we are talking about
the plights of starving children worldwide. Alice says that we must donate to Ox-
fam, and, just then, Oxfam calls. If Alice proceeds to express complete indifference
to donating, we might question whether she was sincere in her previous judgment.
Normative judgments are practical; they are for action.
Contextualism, it seems, has a straightforward explanation. If (29) entails that
the speaker endorses norms which enjoin donating to Oxfam, then one won’t sin-
cerely utter (29) unless one’s own norms enjoin donating.
(29) I must donate to Oxfam.
Moreover a belief ascription like ‘Alice thinks she must donate to Oxfam’ won’t be
true—or, semantically descending, it won’t be the case that Alice thinks she must
donate to Oxfam—unless Alice endorses norms which enjoin donating (or at least
unless Alice thinks she endorses such norms (§3.1)). So, if endorsing norms requir-
ing one to  is the sort of state of mind which motivates one to , there will be an
intimate connection between thinking one must  and being motivated to .
A second commonmotivation for contextualismconcerns themetaphysics, epis-
temology, and metasemantics of normative thought and talk (Wong 2006, Finlay
2009, 2014). A challenge for non-contextualist descriptivist semantics is to explain
what aspect of reality normative sentences describe, what its metaphysical relation
is to other features of reality, and how we come to think, know, and talk about it.
Adopting contextualism seems to provides a way of avoiding such questions. One
needn’t posit a realm of distinctively normative properties or facts for normative
thought and talk to be about. What normative sentences describe are just bodies
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of norms or states of mind. The metaphysics, epistemology, and metasemantics of
normative thought and talk are no more puzzling than the metaphysics, epistemol-
ogy, and metasemantics of thought and talk about bodies of norms (e.g., what is re-
quired according to utilitarianism) or psychologies (e.g., what norms Alice accepts).
Further, by maintaining a descriptivist semantics, the contextualist can still inte-
grate her treatment of normative language with standard views on (e.g.) assertion,
informational and representational content, semantic explanation, logic, truth, and
compositional semantics. This affords a potential advantage over theories, like ex-
pressivism or relativism, which call for revising our understanding of (at least some
of) these issues. Contextualism can thus be of interest to theoristswho are compelled
by the idea that normative thought and talk essentially depends, in some sense, on
context, but who also have reservations about broader implications of revisionary
theories.
A third motivation for contextualism concerns cases of fundamental normative
disagreement (Wong 1984, 2006, Harman 1996; contrastVelleman 2013). Some the-
orists have claimed that at least some fundamental normative disagreements seem
“faultless,” or at least not rationally resolvable. In (8), the intuition would be that
though Alice and Bert disagree, which licenses Bert’s use of ‘no’, neither of them
need be making any cognitive mistake. Though contextualism doesn’t itself require
accepting this idea, certain versions of contextualism provide ways of accommodat-
ing it. For example, the speaker contextualist might treat Alice and Bert’s dispute as
faultless in the sense that both speakers’ assertions are true, and locate the disagree-
ment in conflicting preferences. However, it is contentious how robust intuitions of
apparent faultless disagreement are in various normative domains, and whether the
general notion of faultless disagreement is even coherent (Wright 2001, MacFarlane
2014: 133–6).
If contextualism is a thesis about the conventional meaning and use of a certain
fragment of natural language, it may seem surprising that the view is often advanced
with substantive (meta)normative considerations in mind. Prior to theorizing, one
might not have expected the linguistic issues and the broader philosophical issues
to be so closely intertwined. I would like to make two points about this.
First, perhaps contrary to initial appearances, accepting contextualism doesn’t
itself require taking a stand on the above sorts of metaethical issues. Take the con-
nection with motivation. The crucial move in the above remarks was this: if norm-
acceptance is a motivating attitude, then there will be an intimate connection be-
tween (e.g.) asserting or thinking that one must  and being motivated to . This
antecedent locates a place for theorizing about the nature of norm-acceptance, and
hence about the nature of the connection between normative judgment and mo-
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tivation. Does accepting norms which require one to  essentially involve being
motivated to ? If not, what conditions provide exceptions? Does norm-acceptance
at least essentially involve having certain motivational dispositions or emotional ca-
pacities? The semantics is thus compatiblewith a range of views on the psychology of
judgments characteristically expressed and ascribed using normative language (Silk
2016: §§5.3–5.4).
Similarly, a contextualist semantics is compatible with a range of views on the na-
ture of normativity and the metaphysics of normative properties (Silk 2016: §§3.6,
5.4, 7.4). Compositional semantics takes as given an assignment of values to vari-
ables and other context-sensitive expressions. Compositional semantics with nor-
mative language thus, according to contextualism, takes as given a specific body of
norms which figures in calculating the conventional contents of complex expres-
sions. This leaves open the question of what makes it the case about a concrete
context that it determines such-and-such norms for interpretation. This broadly
metasemantic question locates a place for theorizing about the nature of, and rela-
tions among, the norms supplied across contexts. For instance, consider questions
about the universality of morality. To capture common “relativist” claims, one could
say that different concrete contexts can determine different moral norms. Conflict-
ing moral judgments about a particular case could thus both be true. Those who
defend the objectivity of morality would deny this. They could identify the relevant
moral norms as the correct moral norms, determined independently of particular
speaker intentions. If a universal moral standard was correct, the samemoral norms
would be supplied in all contexts. Importantly, however, this would be a substantive
(meta)normative matter rather than something built into the conventional meaning
of moral language (as on certain invariantist semantics).
Of course, given that contextualism is neutral on these sorts of issues, it is pos-
sible to integrate it with a more internalist moral psychology, parsimonious meta-
physics, etc. But— and this is my second point— this needn’t provide contextu-
alism with an advantage over non-contextualist semantics. For there are ways of
doing so within alternative frameworks as well (Silk 2013, 2016: §§5.4, 6.3.3). Ac-
cording to relativism (in the sense of JohnMacFarlane’s work), normative sentences
are evaluated for truth/falsity with respect to the norms determined by a posited
context of assessment, rather than the context of use. The above sorts of metaethi-
cal questions would be located in the postsemantics of what makes it the case about
a context of assessment that such-and-such norms are in force. Similarly, invari-
antism encodes into the lexical semantics that the relevant norms are determined
solely by the world of evaluation. Different bodies of norms would then correspond
to different languages, i.e. fully formally precise languages (Lewis 1975). The above
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sorts of metaethical questions would be located in the presemantics of what makes
it the case about a linguistic community that such-and-such language is being spo-
ken (e.g., that the string ‘w-r-o-n-g’ corresponds to the lexical item ‘wrong’ which
denotes such-and-such property P).
Theupshot, I take it, is that doing semantics for normative language— theorizing
about its conventional meaning and use— can, and arguably should, be neutral on
certain broader metaethical issues often used to motivate metaethical contextual-
ism. Distinguishing the latter issues from the semantics proper can free up our
(meta)normative inquiries (cf. Forrester 1989: chs. 2, 13; Silk 2013, 2016). This can
motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall
theories. How exactly the various issues interact and mutually constrain theorizing
may be more complicated than initially seemed.
7 Further Issues
In closing I would like to briefly describe several additional issues bearing on devel-
opments of metaethical contextualism.
First, I have focused on context-sensitivity concerning which body of norms is
supplied for interpreting normative language. But there are other respects in which
normative language can be sensitive to context. Notably, it can also be sensitive to
a contextually relevant body of information (Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010, Parfit
2011). We can ask not only what one ought to do in light of all the facts, known
and unknown, but also about one ought to do in light of available information. A
contextualist about the latter talk treats the relevant information as supplied by the
context of use and as figuring in deriving semantic content. Issues parallel to those
from §§2–5 arise for contextualism about information-sensitivity.
Second, normative language isn’t limited to a single syntactic category. There
are normative uses of modal verbs (‘must’, ‘may’), adjectives (‘right’, ‘wrong’), and
nominals (‘obligation’, ‘requirement’). Though these types of expressions may all
seem apt for a contextualist treatment if any are, they differ in important respects.
It is non-trivial how precisely to implement a contextualist account in each case in
the syntax and compositional semantics. Integration with general linguistic work
on modals, adjectives, etc. is essential.
Third, though it is common in discussions of metaethical contextualism to focus
on moral uses, there are many kinds of broadly evaluational language. A distinc-
tion is sometimes made between deontic terms (‘must’, ‘permissible’) and evalua-
tive terms (‘good’, ‘bad’), but there are also relevant sub-categories— expressions of
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aesthetics (‘beautiful’), taste (‘tasty’), desirability (‘wonderful’), humor (‘hilarious’),
etc. Though these exhibit much of the same distinctive linguistic behavior discussed
above, there are non-trivial differences among them—e.g., concerning performa-
tivity, multidimensionality, and embedding behavior (Silk 2016: ch. 7). Many of
these differences are not yet well-understood. Integration with research on linguis-
tic expressives (Potts 2005)— epithets, slurs, honorifics, etc.—promises fruitful av-
enues to explore.
Fourth, there is a range of expressions exhibiting the apparently distinctive kind
of context-sensitivity exhibited by normative language. Recent debates have targeted
epistemic vocabulary, predicates of personal taste, and gradable adjectives, among
others (Egan et al. 2005, Lasersohn 2005, Richard 2008, DeRose 2009, MacFarlane
2014, Silk 2016). More systematic investigation of the precise similarities/differences
among them, aswell as among context-sensitive expressionsmore generally, is needed
(cf. Tonhauser et al. 2013, Silk 2016). Metaethical inquiry into context-sensitivity in
normative language can thus be seen as part of the larger body of research on the
varieties of context-sensitivity in interpretation.
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